Global Imbalances by Cooper, Richard N.
Global Imbalances
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Cooper, Richard N. 2013. Global Imbalances. In the Proceedings of
the China-US Economists Symposium, Beijing, China, April 12-13,
2013.
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:27304673
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions





	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Conference	  Draft	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Global	  Imbalances	  
China-­‐US	  Economists	  Symposium	  
Beijing,	  April	  12-­‐13,	  2013	  
Richard	  N.	  Cooper	  
Harvard	  University	  
	  
	   Over	  the	  decades	  there	  has	  been	  a	  debate	  whether	  or	  not	  economics	  is	  a	  “science,”	  and	  
whether	  any	  discipline	  which	  purports	  to	  describe	  human	  behavior	  can	  be	  a	  science.	  	  Sciences	  have	  
“laws”	  that	  govern	  behavior;	  to	  what	  such	  laws	  are	  human	  beings	  subject?	  	  Without	  getting	  into	  
essentially	  a	  semantic	  discussion	  about	  what	  is	  a	  “science,”	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  economics	  does	  have	  
“laws.”	  	  They	  are	  not	  behavioral	  laws,	  but	  rather	  accounting	  identities	  which	  must	  be	  obeyed	  
everywhere	  and	  at	  all	  times	  (apart	  from	  measurement	  errors);	  the	  question	  is	  not	  whether	  they	  are	  
universally	  applicable,	  but	  whether	  in	  particular	  circumstances	  they	  are	  relevant.	  	  Three	  such	  “laws”	  of	  
economics	  will	  concern	  us	  here:	  
(1) 	  	  	  	  	  X	  –M	  =	  S	  –	  I	  +	  (T	  –	  G),	  derived	  from	  the	  system	  of	  national	  accounts;	  
(2) 	  	  	  	  	  X	  –	  M	  =	  CA	  =	  Net	  Foreign	  Investment,	  derived	  from	  balance	  of	  payments	  accounts;	  
(3) 	  	  	  	  	  ∑CA	  over	  all	  countries	  =	  0.	  
Here	  X	  is	  exports	  of	  goods	  and	  services,	  S	  is	  non-­‐public	  saving,	  I	  is	  national	  investment,	  T	  is	  tax	  receipts	  
of	  all	  levels	  of	  government,	  G	  is	  expenditures	  on	  goods	  and	  services	  by	  all	  levels	  of	  government,	  and	  CA	  
is	  the	  balance	  of	  international	  payments	  on	  current	  account.	  
	   Since	  these	  equations	  always	  apply	  to	  every	  country,	  how	  can	  there	  be	  “imbalances?”	  	  When	  
this	  term	  is	  used,	  as	  it	  is	  frequently,	  it	  usually	  means	  that	  the	  writer	  does	  not	  like	  the	  value	  of	  one	  or	  
more	  of	  the	  variables.	  	  Often	  writers	  are	  too	  embarrassed	  to	  say	  that	  they	  do	  not	  like	  the	  observed	  
configuration,	  so	  they	  call	  it	  “unsustainable.”	  	  Some	  configurations	  are	  indeed	  unsustainable,	  as	  will	  be	  
illustrated	  below,	  but	  as	  Herb	  Stein	  observed	  decades	  ago,	  if	  something	  is	  unsustainable,	  it	  will	  stop.	  	  So	  
when	  something	  is	  said	  to	  be	  unsustainable,	  that	  is	  often	  short-­‐hand	  for	  saying	  that	  unless	  we	  do	  
something	  about	  it	  the	  way	  it	  will	  stop	  will	  be	  undesirable.	  	  And	  sometimes	  a	  configuration	  that	  is	  
perfectly	  sustainable	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  undesirable.	  
	   The	  most	  important	  global	  imbalance	  (singular)	  at	  the	  present	  time	  is	  a	  global	  aggregate	  
demand	  for	  goods	  and	  services	  that	  falls	  short	  of	  the	  global	  capacity	  to	  produce	  goods	  and	  services.	  	  The	  
manifestations	  of	  this	  are	  recessions	  in	  the	  Eurozone,	  Britain,	  and	  Japan;	  weak	  recovery	  from	  recession	  
in	  the	  United	  States;	  falling	  growth	  rates	  in	  Brazil,	  India,	  South	  Africa,	  and	  many	  other	  countries;	  and	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high	  or	  rising	  unemployment	  in	  many	  places.	  	  The	  accounting	  identities	  are	  all	  satisfied,	  but	  investment,	  
consumption,	  and	  government	  spending	  taken	  together	  are	  too	  low,	  leaving	  resources	  under-­‐utilized,	  
i.e.	  wasted.	  	  A	  growth	  of	  exports	  can	  help	  an	  individual	  country	  overcome	  a	  recession,	  and	  often	  does;	  
but	  by	  virtue	  of	  equation	  (3)	  it	  cannot	  help	  the	  world	  overcome	  inadequate	  demand	  (although	  a	  general	  
stimulus	  to	  exports,	  such	  as	  is	  claimed	  for	  the	  pending	  Trans-­‐Atlantic	  Partnership,	  could	  potentially	  raise	  
investment	  in	  both	  parties).	  
The	  reasons	  for	  this	  global	  condition,	  which	  marks	  a	  sharp	  contrast	  from	  ten	  years	  ago	  when	  the	  
world	  economy	  was	  booming,	  are	  complex,	  but	  the	  major	  one	  is	  probably	  a	  perception	  of	  excessive	  debt	  
inherited	  from	  the	  boom	  period	  and	  subsequent	  financial	  crisis	  and	  recession	  of	  2007-­‐2008.	  	  Households	  
and	  financial	  corporations	  built	  up	  very	  high	  debts	  during	  the	  2000s,	  and	  government	  debt	  rose	  sharply	  
after	  the	  crisis	  as	  a	  result	  of	  recession-­‐induced	  shortfalls	  of	  tax	  revenues,	  financial	  support	  for	  financial	  
(and	  sometimes	  other)	  institutions,	  and	  fiscal	  stimulus	  programs.	  	  The	  high	  debt	  burdens	  and	  weak	  
balance-­‐of-­‐payments	  conditions	  limit	  the	  ability	  of	  many	  countries	  to	  take	  further	  fiscal	  expansionary	  
actions.	  	  But	  they	  could	  be	  taken	  by	  countries	  with	  current	  account	  surpluses	  (indicating	  a	  lack	  of	  
dependence	  on	  net	  inflows	  of	  foreign	  capital,	  via	  equation	  (2))	  and	  that	  still	  have	  relatively	  low	  public	  
debt.	  	  The	  list	  includes	  especially	  Germany	  and	  China	  among	  large	  countries,	  along	  with	  the	  
Netherlands,	  Switzerland,	  Taiwan,	  and	  a	  host	  of	  smaller	  economies.	  	  Under	  its	  new	  government	  Japan	  is	  
undertaking	  a	  program	  of	  fiscal	  stimulus	  despite	  its	  high	  public	  debt.	  	  The	  United	  States	  is	  in	  a	  special	  
category:	  although	  it	  has	  a	  large	  current	  account	  deficit,	  its	  dollar-­‐denominated	  securities	  are	  in	  wide	  
demand	  around	  the	  world,	  by	  both	  private	  and	  official	  investors,	  so	  it	  also	  has	  scope	  for	  further	  fiscal	  
expansion.	  	  Concretely,	  	  today’s	  exceptionally	  low	  long-­‐term	  interest	  rates,	  themselves	  the	  result	  of	  
weak	  aggregate	  demand,	  make	  it	  an	  especially	  good	  time	  for	  long-­‐term	  borrowing	  to	  finance	  desirable	  
long-­‐term	  public	  investments	  –	  including	  maintenance	  or	  replacement	  of	  aging	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  the	  United	  States,	  installation	  of	  needed	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  case	  of	  countries	  such	  as	  Brazil	  and	  
India.	  
There	  must	  have	  been	  some	  large	  and	  unsustainable	  imbalances	  in	  the	  world	  economy	  five	  
years	  ago,	  since	  a	  big	  financial	  crisis	  started	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  in	  turn	  led	  to	  a	  worldwide	  
recession;	  and	  a	  financial	  crisis	  continues	  in	  Europe.	  	  But	  what	  exactly	  were	  the	  imbalances?	  	  Clearly	  the	  
United	  States	  was	  building	  too	  much	  housing,	  over	  2	  million	  units	  in	  2005,	  compared	  with	  a	  normal	  
needed	  growth	  of	  about	  1.5	  million	  units.	  These	  units	  were	  being	  financed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  was	  fragile,	  
such	  that	  a	  weakening	  of	  housing	  prices	  led	  to	  a	  decline	  in	  construction	  and	  a	  decline	  in	  value	  of	  
construction	  loans	  and	  especially	  to	  a	  decline	  in	  value	  of	  mortgages	  that	  were	  used	  to	  purchase	  the	  
housing	  units,	  which	  in	  turn	  adversely	  affected	  mortgage-­‐backed	  securities,	  which	  in	  turn	  led	  to	  a	  drying	  
up	  of	  short-­‐term	  credit	  to	  many	  borrowers.	  
But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  imbalance	  that	  was	  under	  discussion	  in	  international	  circles.	  The	  references	  
were	  sometime	  frustratingly	  vague,	  but	  sometimes	  	  focused	  explicitly	  on	  imbalances	  in	  current	  
accounts,	  and	  especially	  on	  the	  large	  current	  account	  deficit	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  briefly	  reached	  
6	  percent	  of	  GDP	  	  but	  was	  a	  huge	  number	  because	  of	  the	  large	  size	  of	  the	  American	  economy;	  and	  on	  
the	  large	  current	  account	  surplus	  of	  China,	  which	  briefly	  reached	  10	  percent	  of	  its	  GDP,	  and	  to	  a	  less	  
extent	  the	  surpluses	  of	  Japan	  and	  Germany.	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Table	  1	  reports	  the	  largest	  current	  account	  surpluses	  and	  deficits	  estimated	  for	  2012.	  	  The	  
United	  States	  has	  far	  the	  largest	  deficit,	  although	  down	  substantially	  from	  six	  years	  earlier,	  followed	  at	  
some	  distance	  by	  India,	  Britain,	  Canada,	  France,	  and	  Brazil.	  Deficits	  of	  Spain	  and	  Italy	  are	  suppressed	  by	  
recession	  in	  those	  countries.	  	  The	  largest	  deficits	  relative	  to	  GDP	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Turkey,	  South	  Africa,	  
and	  India.	  	  On	  the	  surplus	  side,	  Germany	  seems	  to	  have	  replaced	  China	  with	  the	  largest	  surplus	  (they	  are	  
close,	  so	  this	  may	  change	  when	  the	  final	  figures	  are	  in),	  followed	  by	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  Russia,	  Switzerland,	  
and	  the	  Netherlands.	  	  Relative	  to	  GDP,	  Singapore	  holds	  the	  record,	  followed	  by	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  Norway,	  
Switzerland,	  Taiwan,	  and	  the	  Netherlands.	  	  Japan	  is	  still	  in	  the	  list	  of	  surplus	  countries,	  but	  has	  dropped	  
to	  number	  eight	  in	  value,	  and	  only	  0.4	  percent	  relative	  to	  GDP.	  	  What	  is	  striking	  is	  that	  most	  countries	  in	  
both	  columns	  are	  relatively	  rich,	  or	  are	  rapidly	  becoming	  rich.	  	  India	  and	  Indonesia	  are	  the	  only	  really	  
poor	  countries	  in	  the	  deficit	  column,	  although	  the	  source	  does	  not	  report	  Bangladesh,	  Egypt,	  Nigeria,	  
Philippines,	  or	  Vietnam.	  
Are	  these	  figures	  troubling?	  	  Do	  they	  represent	  unsustainable,	  or	  possibly	  sustainable	  but	  
undesirable,	  imbalances,	  needing	  to	  be	  corrected?	  	  I	  do	  not	  know,	  but	  would	  like	  to	  introduce	  some	  
words	  of	  caution	  about	  drawing	  such	  a	  conclusion	  and	  then	  attempting	  actions	  to	  correct	  the	  
imbalances.	  
In	  a	  world	  with	  globalized	  financial	  markets	  we	  should	  expect	  larger	  current	  account	  
imbalances.	  	  Globalized	  financial	  markets	  open	  new	  opportunities	  for	  savers,	  to	  improve	  yield,	  diversify	  
risk,	  enhance	  safety,	  and	  gain	  liquidity.	  	  Many	  factors	  influence	  foreign	  investment,	  but	  among	  them	  is	  
demographic	  trends.	  	  The	  entire	  world	  is	  aging,	  but	  at	  very	  different	  rates,	  and	  for	  two	  quite	  different	  
reasons.	  	  Longevity	  is	  increasing	  almost	  everywhere,	  and	  birth	  rates	  have	  fallen	  almost	  everywhere,	  but	  
at	  different	  rates.	  	  Increased	  longevity	  raises	  concerns	  about	  consumption	  after	  retirement,	  and	  can	  be	  
expected	  to	  increase	  savings	  by	  households	  during	  their	  high	  income	  years,	  and/or	  lead	  to	  
postponement	  of	  retirement	  (so	  far	  we	  have	  seen	  very	  little	  of	  the	  latter).	  	  Lower	  birth	  rates	  can	  lead	  to	  
reduced	  investment,	  both	  for	  housing	  and	  associated	  expenditures	  by	  young	  adults,	  and	  for	  capital	  in	  
the	  workplace	  as	  fewer	  people	  enter	  the	  labor	  force.	  	  On	  both	  counts,	  saving	  should	  rise	  relative	  to	  
investment	  and	  the	  current	  account,	  other	  things	  equal,	  will	  improve.	  	  In	  contrast,	  countries	  with	  a	  rapid	  
increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  young	  adults	  will	  need	  more	  investment	  and	  see	  some	  deterioration	  in	  the	  
current	  account.	  
These	  demographic	  factors	  might	  help	  explain	  the	  surpluses	  of	  Germany,	  South	  Korea,	  
Singapore,	  and	  others;	  but	  on	  these	  grounds	  rapidly	  aging	  Spain	  and	  Italy	  also	  ought	  to	  be	  running	  
current	  account	  surpluses	  before	  large-­‐scale	  retirement	  starts.	  	  Japan	  is	  the	  country	  most	  advanced	  in	  
the	  aging	  process.	  	  Japan	  ran	  significant	  current	  account	  surpluses	  for	  three	  decades,	  building	  up	  large	  
claims	  on	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  (via	  equation	  2),	  but	  now	  (as	  expected	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  demography)	  the	  
trade	  surplus	  is	  declining	  and	  Japanese	  increasingly	  live	  off	  the	  earnings	  of	  their	  large	  overseas	  
investments;	  eventually,	  as	  aging	  continues,	  Japanese	  may	  begin	  to	  liquidate	  those	  investments	  and	  the	  




Demographic	  factors	  also	  help	  to	  explain	  some	  of	  the	  deficits,	  especially	  those	  of	  India,	  
Indonesia,	  and	  paradoxically	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  is	  aging	  much	  more	  slowly	  than	  other	  rich	  or	  East	  
Asian	  countries	  and	  experiences	  a	  rapid	  increase	  in	  young	  adults,	  due	  significantly	  to	  immigration	  (see	  
Table	  2).	  	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  of	  Australia	  and	  Canada,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  rich	  countries	  which	  also	  
have	  unexploited	  natural	  resources.	  
China	  is	  among	  the	  countries	  aging	  most	  rapidly	  in	  the	  coming	  decades,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  in	  a	  period	  
of	  rapid	  urbanization,	  with	  its	  heavy	  demands	  for	  housing,	  for	  urban	  infrastructure,	  and	  for	  providing	  
the	  rapidly	  growing	  urban	  work	  force	  with	  structures	  and	  equipment.	  	  These	  factors	  all	  raise	  investment	  
requirements	  relative	  to	  more	  settled	  societies.	  	  Thus	  both	  household	  saving	  and	  investment	  will	  be	  
high,	  with	  the	  net	  effect	  on	  the	  current	  account	  unclear.	  	  Also,	  China	  does	  not	  permit	  residents	  to	  invest	  
freely	  abroad,	  so	  it	  is	  not	  integrated	  fully	  into	  the	  global	  capital	  market,	  denying	  savers	  opportunities	  for	  
investment	  overseas.	  
Even	  if,	  despite	  these	  considerations,	  it	  was	  thought	  desirable	  to	  reduce	  current	  account	  
imbalances,	  there	  would	  be	  a	  serious	  problem	  of	  coordination	  in	  doing	  so.	  	  By	  equation	  (3),	  current	  
account	  deficits	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  significantly	  without	  also	  reducing	  significantly	  the	  surpluses	  (or	  
increasing	  other	  deficits).	  	  By	  equation	  (1),	  these	  changes	  can	  only	  be	  brought	  about	  by	  changing	  
investment	  relative	  to	  saving,	  including	  the	  public	  sector.	  	  It	  is	  very	  challenging	  to	  make	  the	  necessary	  
changes	  smoothly	  through	  international	  coordination,	  e.g.	  by	  agreement	  in	  the	  G20,	  given	  the	  
complexities	  of	  public	  decision-­‐making	  in	  most	  countries	  and	  given	  our	  ignorance	  in	  many	  countries	  
about	  how	  to	  influence	  private	  saving	  and	  investment.	  	  The	  main	  instrument	  for	  coordinated	  action	  is	  
thus	  government	  budgets,	  plus	  some	  influence	  through	  monetary	  policy	  on	  interest	  rates	  (in	  the	  United	  
States,	  mainly	  on	  home	  construction),	  and	  on	  exchange	  rates.	  
China	  has	  some	  distinctive	  features.	  	  It	  is	  widely	  recognized,	  not	  least	  by	  the	  Chinese	  
government,	  that	  China	  needs	  to	  “rebalance”	  its	  economy	  –	  concretely,	  away	  from	  its	  dependence	  for	  
growth	  on	  exports	  and	  export-­‐related	  investment,	  toward	  household	  consumption	  and	  government	  
consumption	  on	  behalf	  of	  households.	  Possibly	  excess	  housing	  construction	  is	  also	  a	  concern.	  	  So	  long	  as	  
the	  Chinese	  economy	  was	  relatively	  small,	  and	  emerging	  from	  a	  period	  in	  which	  China	  was	  little	  engaged	  
with	  the	  world	  economy,	  its	  exports	  could	  grow	  rapidly,	  and	  indeed	  they	  grew	  in	  dollar	  value	  at	  17	  
percent	  a	  year	  1980-­‐2010.	  	  China	  is	  now	  by	  value	  the	  world’s	  largest	  exporting	  country,	  and	  it	  can	  no	  
longer	  grow	  its	  exports	  at	  such	  a	  rate,	  continuously	  raising	  its	  share	  of	  world	  exports.	  	  This	  rate	  of	  
growth	  is	  no	  longer	  sustainable;	  if	  China	  does	  not	  take	  steps	  to	  slow	  it	  down,	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  will.	  	  
Already	  Chinese	  products	  are	  the	  largest	  target	  for	  anti-­‐dumping	  duties	  around	  the	  world.	  	  In	  future,	  to	  
a	  first	  approximation	  Chinese	  exports	  will	  be	  able	  to	  grow	  only	  as	  rapidly	  as	  world	  trade	  grows,	  perhaps	  
7-­‐8	  percent	  a	  year	  in	  dollar	  terms.	  	  Thus	  Chinese	  export	  growth	  must	  slow	  down	  significantly,	  and	  with	  it	  
the	  investment	  associated	  with	  that	  growth.	  	  Growth	  in	  consumption	  must	  fill	  the	  gap	  if	  China’s	  overall	  
growth	  rate	  is	  not	  to	  fall	  significantly.	  




1) Permit,	  even	  encourage,	  wages	  to	  rise.	  
2) Pay	  those	  with	  deposits	  in	  state-­‐owned	  banks	  higher	  interest	  rates,	  on	  which	  there	  is	  now	  a	  
low	  ceiling	  imposed	  by	  regulation.	  
3) Increase	  government	  spending	  on	  activities	  directly	  beneficial	  to	  households,	  especially	  
health	  care	  and	  education;	  public	  pensions	  could	  also	  be	  increased,	  and	  their	  scope	  
widened.	  
4) Appreciate	  the	  currency	  more	  rapidly,	  to	  reduce	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  exports	  and	  to	  
make	  imports	  for	  consumption	  less	  expensive.	  	  The	  exchange	  rate	  is	  now	  controlled	  by	  the	  
government.	  
There	  are	  potential	  objections	  to	  each	  of	  these	  actions.	  	  Higher	  interest	  rates	  on	  deposits	  will	  
put	  financial	  pressures	  on	  banks	  that	  face	  in	  future	  a	  sharp	  rise	  in	  non-­‐performing	  loans.	  	  This	  could	  be	  
mitigated	  by	  permitting	  lending	  rates	  also	  to	  rise,	  which	  would	  have	  the	  incidental	  effect	  of	  discouraging	  
some	  housing	  construction;	  or	  by	  recapitalizing	  the	  banks,	  which	  will	  probably	  be	  required	  at	  some	  time	  
in	  any	  case.	  More	  government	  spending	  on	  health	  care	  and	  education,	  except	  for	  higher	  pay,	  would	  
perhaps	  require	  additional	  skilled	  personnel,	  which	  cannot	  be	  created	  quickly,	  but	  could	  be	  created	  over	  
time	  by	  steering	  greatly	  increased	  university	  graduates	  in	  those	  directions,	  e.g.	  through	  higher	  wages.	  	  It	  
would	  also	  enlarge	  the	  budget	  deficit,	  although	  the	  central	  government	  of	  China,	  with	  relatively	  little	  
outstanding	  debt,	  has	  more	  room	  than	  many	  countries	  for	  fiscal	  expansion.	  	  In	  any	  case	  the	  impact	  on	  
the	  deficit	  could	  be	  reduced	  by	  requiring	  profitable	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  to	  pay	  higher	  dividends	  or	  
increased	  taxes	  to	  the	  central	  government.	  	  Effluent	  charges	  could	  also	  be	  introduced,	  to	  reduce	  air	  and	  
water	  pollution	  and	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissiions.	  
Appreciation	  of	  the	  currency	  will	  slow	  and	  perhaps	  even	  reverse	  the	  flow	  of	  labor	  into	  the	  
export	  sectors.	  	  But	  that	  is	  what	  rebalancing	  requires.	  	  Service	  industries	  would	  expand	  with	  ever	  greater	  
household	  consumption,	  and	  on	  average	  they	  are	  more	  labor-­‐intensive	  than	  are	  the	  export	  sectors,	  so	  
total	  growth	  in	  urban	  employment	  need	  not	  suffer.	  Appreciation	  of	  the	  rmb	  will	  also	  relieve	  pressure	  on	  
the	  Peoples	  Bank	  of	  China	  with	  respect	  to	  monetary	  policy,	  making	  it	  easier	  to	  execute	  anti-­‐inflationary	  
monetary	  policy	  when	  that	  is	  required.	  
Home	  construction	  for	  investment	  by	  buyers	  can	  be	  discouraged	  by	  introducing	  property	  taxes	  
and	  a	  capital	  gains	  tax	  on	  any	  profitable	  sales.	  	  These	  should	  have	  been	  introduced	  some	  time	  ago.	  
Policy	  changes	  that	  hurt	  some	  people	  are	  never	  easy.	  	  But	  China	  has	  shown	  a	  greater	  capacity	  
than	  other	  countries	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  past,	  particularly	  with	  respect	  to	  land	  acquisition	  for	  public	  purposes	  
or	  development.	  	  The	  social	  role	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  is	  to	  decide	  the	  best	  course	  of	  action	  
for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  country	  and	  then	  push	  it	  through	  a	  compliant	  National	  People’s	  Congress,	  
compensating	  those	  who	  are	  hurt	  from	  the	  high	  social	  gains.	  
Of	  course,	  equation	  (3)	  continues	  to	  apply.	  	  China	  cannot	  reduce	  its	  current	  account	  surplus	  
unless	  other	  countries	  reduce	  their	  deficits	  (or	  increase	  their	  surpluses).	  By	  equation	  (1),	  they	  must	  
increase	  their	  savings	  relative	  to	  investment,	  including	  the	  public	  sector.	  	  Much	  of	  that	  is	  already	  going	  
on	  in	  Europe	  with	  budget	  austerity	  being	  imposed	  on	  several	  countries,	  and	  where	  even	  Germany,	  with	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its	  already	  large	  current	  account	  surplus,	  is	  striving	  to	  meet	  its	  constitutionally	  required	  balanced	  budget	  
a	  year	  early,	  in	  2015.	  	  And	  President	  Obama’s	  forward-­‐looking	  program	  for	  the	  United	  States	  would	  on	  
its	  projections	  reduce	  the	  US	  federal	  budget	  deficit	  from	  7.0	  percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  2012	  to	  less	  than	  3	  
percent	  by	  2022.	  	  This	  target,	  which	  ceteris	  paribus	  implies	  an	  increase	  in	  national	  saving,	  will	  be	  easier	  
to	  meet	  if	  China	  succeeds	  in	  its	  economic	  rebalancing	  away	  from	  exports	  toward	  domestic	  consumption.	  	  
Table	  1	  
	  
Table	  2	  
